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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of integrating commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software components into systems with
high dependability requirements. These components, by their very nature, are built to be reused as black boxes that
cannot be modified. Instead, the system architect has to rely on techniques external with respect to the component for
resolving mismatches of the services required and provided that might arise in the interaction of the component and its
environment. An approach is described in this paper to how these techniques should be structured around the COTS
component to obtain an idealised fault-tolerant component. The approach employs the layer-based C2 architectural style
for structuring mechanisms of error detection and recovery that should be integrated into the software architecture. The
feasibility of the proposed approach is presented in the context of a steam boiler system which contains a COTS
controller.
1. Introduction
Component-based software development (CBSD) is recognized today as an effective way to reduce development costs and
time-to-market [S98]. Until recently, the majority of CBSD uses was primarily for client-tier applications, with little
attention paid to server-tier components [BW98]. Components at the client side are usually fine-grained classes of simple
objects, such as boxes and buttons on the user's screen. Their counterparts at the server side are large-grained components
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encapsulating complex business rules or infrastructure services, usually comprising a set of related components such as
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) application frameworks and data base managers.
Today the main challenges of component-based software engineering (CBSE) are in guaranteeing system safety,
reliability, and security [V98]. Although the fundamental principles of CBSD apply to both client-side and server-side
portions of a system equally, their dependability requirements are substantially different. A COTS component is usually
provided as a black box to be reused "as it is", which can independently evolve after it was integrated. These components
usually do not have complete rigorously-written specification, there is no guarantee that the description the integrators
have in their disposal is correct (very often it is ambiguous). These components can have bugs, moreover, the specific
context in which they are used is not known at their development time. When integrating such a component into a system
with high dependability requirements we should employ solutions at the architectural level to ensure that these
requirements are met, irrespective of faults in the COTS component itself or in the way it interacts with the other system
components.
Research into describing software architectures with respect to their dependability properties has recently gained
considerable attention [SI99, S01, S98]. In [GRL02] the idealised fault-tolerant component concept [AL81] is applied in
the architectural description of fault-tolerant component-based systems. [PR01] puts forward a general approach to
developing protective wrappers to be used for building dependable software systems based on COTS components. In this
paper we combine the concepts of an idealised architectural component and protective wrappers to develop an
architectural solution that provides an effective and systematic way for building dependable software systems from COTS
software components. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss background
work on the idealised fault-tolerant component, architectural mismatches and the C2 architectural style. Section 3
describes the architectural representation of idealised fault-tolerant COTS. The case study demonstrating the feasibility of
the proposed approach is presented in section 4. Related work on how to build dependable software system based on
COTS components is discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 presents some concluding remarks and discusses our future
work.
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2. Background
2.1. Architectural Mismatches and COTS Component Integration
Dealing with architectural mismatches [GAO95] is one of the most difficult problems system integrators face when
developing architectural approaches to integrating systems with COTS components. An architectural mismatch occurs
when the assumptions that a component makes about another component or the rest of the system do not match. That is,
the assumptions associated with the service provided by the component are different from the assumptions associated with
the services required by the component for behaving as specified [OWZ98]. When building systems from existing
components, it is inevitable that incompatibilities between the service delivered by the component and the service that the
rest of the system expects from that component, give rise to such mismatches. These mismatches are not exclusive to the
functional attributes of the component; mismatches may also include quality attributes, such as dependability, which can
be related to the component failure mode assumptions or its safety integrity levels.
We view all incompatibilities between a COTS component and the rest of the system as architectural mismatches. This,
for example, includes internal faults of a COTS component that affect others system components or its environment, in
which case the failure assumptions of the component were wrong.
2.2. The C2 Architectural Style
Architectural structures of a system tend to abstract away the details of the system, but assist in understanding broader
system-level concerns [SG96]. This is achieved by employing architectural styles that are appropriate for describing the
system in terms of its components, the interactions between these components - connectors, and the properties that
regulate the composition of components - configurations.
The C2 architectural style is a component-based style that supports large grain reuse and flexible system composition,
emphasizing weak bindings between components [TMA+96]. In this style, components of a system may be completely
unaware of each other, as when one integrates various COTS components, which may have heterogeneous styles and
implementation languages. These components communicate only through asynchronous messages mediated by connectors
that are responsible for message routing, broadcasting and filtering. Interface and architectural mismatches are dealt with
by means of wrappers that encapsulate each component.
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In the C2 architectural style both components and connectors (Figure 1) have a top interface and a bottom interface.
Systems are composed in a layered style, where the top interface of a component may be connected to the bottom interface
of a connector and its bottom interface may be connected to the top interface of another connector. Each side of a
connector may be connected to any number of components or connectors.
Component
Connector
Component
Component
Notifications
Requests
top interface
bottom interface
top interface
bottom interface
Figure 1. C2 Style Basic Elements
There are two types of messages in C2: requests and notifications. Requests flow up through the system layers and
notifications flow down. In response to a request, a component may emit a notification back to the components below,
through its bottom interface. Upon receiving a notification, a component may react with the implicit invocation of one of
its operations.
3. Idealised Fault-Tolerant COTS Component
Current large scale systems usually integrate COTS components which may act as service providers and/or service users.
Since, there is no control, or even full knowledge, over the design, implementation and evolution of COTS components,
the evolutionary process of a COTS component should be considered as part of a complex environment, physical and
logical, that might directly affect the system components. In order to build a dependable software system from
untrustworthy COTS components, the system should treat these components as a potential source of faults. The overall
software system should be able to support COTS components while preventing the propagation of errors. In other words,
the system should be able to tolerate faults that may reside or occur inside the COTS components, while not being able to
directly inspect or modify its  internal state or behaviour.
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In this paper, we present the concept of an idealised fault-tolerant COTS component, which is an architectural solution
that encapsulates a COTS component adding fault tolerance capabilities to allow it to be integrated in a larger system.
These fault tolerant capabilities are related to the activities associated with error processing, that is, error detection and
error recovery. The idealised fault-tolerant COTS component is a specialization of the idealised C2 Component (iC2C)
[GRL02], which is briefly described in the following section.
3.1. The Idealised C2 Component (iC2C)
The idealised C2 component (iC2C) is equivalent, in terms of behaviour and structure, to the idealised fault-tolerant
component [AL81] and designed to allow the structuring of software architectures compliant with the C2 architectural
style [TMA+96]. Service requests and normal responses of an idealised fault-tolerant component are mapped as requests
and notifications in the C2 architectural style. Interface and failure exceptions of an idealised fault-tolerant component
are considered subtypes of notifications.  In order to minimize the impact of fault tolerance provisions on the system
complexity, we have decoupled the normal activity and abnormal activity parts of the idealised component. This outcome
has lead to an overall structure for the iC2C that has two distinct components and three connectors, as shown in Figure 2.
The iC2C NormalActivity component implements the normal behaviour, and is responsible for error detection during
normal operation, and the signalling of interface and internal exceptions. The iC2C AbnormalActivity component is
responsible for error recovery, and the signalling of failure exceptions. For consistency, the signalling of an internal
exception by an idealised fault-tolerant component was mapped as a subtype of notification, and, the “return to normal”,
flowing in the opposite direction, was mapped as a request. During error recovery, the AbnormalActivity component may
also emit requests and receive notifications, which are not shown in Figure 2.
The connectors of our iC2C (Figure 2) are specialized reusable C2 connectors with the following roles.
(i) The iC2C_bottom connector connects the iC2C with the lower components of a C2 configuration, and serializes the
requests received. Once a request is accepted, this connector queues new requests that are received until completion of
the first request. When a request is completed, a notification is sent back, which may be a normal response, an
interface exception or a failure exception.
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(ii) The iC2C_internal connector controls message flow inside the iC2C, selecting the destination of each message
received based on its originator, the message type and the operational state of the iC2C (either under normal or
abnormal operation).
(iii) The iC2C_top connector connects the iC2C with the upper components of a C2 configuration, which may provide
services to the NormalActivity and/or AbnormalActivity components.
The overall structure defined for the idealised C2 component is fully compliant with the component rules of the C2
architectural style. This allows an iC2C to be integrated into any C2 configuration and interact with components of a
larger system. When this interaction establishes a chain of iC2C components, the external exceptions raised by a
component can be handled by a lower level component (in the C2 sense of “upper” and “lower”) allowing hierarchical
structuring of error recovery activities. An iC2C may also interact with a regular C2 component, either requesting or
providing services.
Service
Requests
Normal
Responses
Interface
Exceptions  
Failure
Exceptions
iC2C_top connector 
NormalActivity
iC2C_internal connector
Internal
Exceptions
Return to
Normal
AbnormalActivity
 
iC2C_bottom connector  
Service
Requests
Normal
Responses
Interface
Exceptions
Failure
Exceptions
Component
Component
Figure 2. Idealised C2 Component (iC2C)
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3.2. COTS Component Protectors
Component wrapping is a well-known structuring technique that has been used in several areas. In this paper, we use
term “wrapper” in a very broad sense, incorporating the concepts of wrappers, mediators, and bridges [D99]. A wrapper
is a specialised component inserted between a component and its environment to deal with the flows of control and data
going to and/or from the wrapped component. The need for wrapping arises when (i) it is impossible or expensive to
change the components when reusing them as parts of a new system, or (ii) if it is easier to add new features by
incorporating them into wrappers. Wrapping is a structured and a cost-effective solution to many problems in component-
based software development. Wrappers can be employed for improving quality properties of the components such as
adding caching and buffering, dealing with mismatches or simplifying the component interface. With respect to
dependability, wrappers are usually used for ensuring security, transparent component replication, etc.
A systematic approach has been proposed for using protective wrappers, known as protectors, that can improve the
overall system dependability. This is achieved by protecting both the system against erroneous behaviour of a COTS
component, and the COTS component against erroneous requests from the rest of the system. The wrappers are viewed as
redundant software that detects errors or suspicious activity and executes appropriate recovery when possible.
The development of protectors is considered as a part of system integration activities [PR01]. The approach consists of
rigorous specification of the wrapper functionality in forms of acceptable behaviour contraints (ABCs) and in their
execution at run time in the form of executable assertions detecting a contraint violation and of exception handlers
recovering after it. The general sources of information to be used in developing both ABCs and possible actions to be
undertaken in response to their violations are the following:
(i) The behaviour specification of COTS components as specified by the COTS’s developers.
(ii) The behaviour specification of a COTS component as specified by the system designers. This description and the
previous one must satisfy certain mutual constraints for the system design to be correct, but they will not be identical.
E.g., the system designer's description requires the COTS component to be able to react to a set of stimuli that is a
subset of the set specified by the COTS’s developers.
(iii) The behaviour that the system designer expects from a COTS component (not necessarily approving it), based on
previous experiences with it, i.e., he/she may know that it often fails in response to certain legal stimuli.
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(iv) Component (COTS or part of the rest of the system) behaviour that system designers considers especially
unacceptable, without knowing whether it is likely or not.
(v) The behaviour specifications of the rest of the system.
ABCs are represented as executable assertions, the main elements of which are system states and sequences of system
events as seen by the wrapper. The sources of information above allow the developer to formulate a number of statements
describing the correct behaviour of the system (consisting in this case of the COTS component and of the rest of the
system). The statements are expressed as a set of assertions on the states of input and output parameters. In addition to
that they can include assertions on the histories (sequences of calls) that the protector has to collect and assertions on the
states of the system components which are to be retrieved by the protector by calling side-effect-free functions returning
the states of these components. While [PR01] deals with the design of COTS protectors and its development process, in
this paper we are mainly concerned with architectural issues related to their integration in a fault-tolerant component-
based system.
3.3. Idealised C2 COTS (iCOTS)
A protective wrapper for a COTS software component is a special type of application-specific fault-tolerance capability.
To be effective, the design of fault-tolerance capabilities must be concerned with architectural issues, such as process
distribution and communication mode, that impact the overall system dependability. Although the C2 architectural style
is specially suited for integrating COTS components into a larger system, its rules on topology and
communication are not adequate for incorporating fault tolerance mechanisms into C2 software
architectures, especially the mechanisms used for error detection and fault containment [GRL02].
The idealised C2 fault-tolerant component (iC2C) architectural solution (section 3.1) overcomes
these problems leveraging the C2 architectural style to allow such COTS software components to be
integrated  in dependable systems.
The idealised C2 COTS (iCOTS) is a specialization of the iC2C aiming to add protective wrappers to a COTS component
to be integrated in a software system. In our approach, the COTS component is encapsulated into the NormalActivity
component of an iC2C, wrapped by two specialized connectors acting as error detectors (Figure 3). These detectors are
responsible for verifying that the messages that flows to/from the COTS being wrapped do not violate the acceptable
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behaviour constraints specified for that system. The lower_detector inspects incoming requests and outgoing responses
(C2 notifications) from/to the COTS clients while the upper_detector inspects outgoing requests and incoming responses
to/from other components providing services to the COTS.
COTS
NormalActivity
AbnormalActivity
upper_detector
lower_detector
iC2C_top
iC2C_internal
iC2C_bottom
Figure 3. Idealised C2 COTS (iCOTS) Overall Structure
When a contraint violation is detected, the detector sends an exception notification which will be handled by the
AbnormalActivity component, following the rules defined for the iC2C. Any of these detectors may be decomposed in a
set of special purpose error detectors which, in their turn, are wrapped by a pair of connectors. For example, Figure 4
shows an upper_detector decomposed into a number of error detectors. The detector_bottom coordinates error
detection, and the detector_top connects the whole detector either to the COTS or to the iC2C top_connector.
Error
Detector
Error
Detector
(1) (n)
upper_detector
detector_bottom
detector_top
. . .
Figure 4. Decomposition of a Detector
The AbnormalActivity component is responsible for both error diagnosis and error recovery. Depending on the
complexity of these tasks, it may be convenient to decompose it into more specialized components for error diagnosis and
a set of error handlers, as illustrated by Figure 5.  This design allows the ErrorDiagnosis component to react directly to
exceptions raised by the NormalActivity component and send notifications to activate the ErrorHandlers or,
alternatively, to stand as a service provider of requests sent by the ErrorHandlers.
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Error
Handler . . .
Error
Handler
AbnormalActivity
(1) (n)
NormalActivity
Error
Diagnosis
iC2C_top
iC2C_internal
iC2C_bottom
Figure 5. Decomposition of the AbnormalActivity
4. Case Study
4.1. Problem Statement
Anderson et. al. [AF03] present the results of a case study in protective wrapper development [PR01], in which a
Simulink model of a steam boiler system is used together with an off-the-shelf PID (Proportional, Integral and Derivative)
controller. The protective wrappers are developed to allow detection and recovery from typical errors caused by
unavailability of signals, violations of limitations, and oscillations.
The boiler system comprises the following components: the physical boiler, the control system and the rest of the system.
In turn, the control system consists of PID controllers, which are the COTS components, and the rest of the system
consisting of:
(i) Sensors - these are "smart" sensors that monitor variables providing input to the PID controllers: the drum level, the
steam flow, the steam pressure, the gas concentrations and the coal feeder rate.
(ii) Actuators - these devices control a heating burner that can be ON/OFF, and adjust inlet/outlet valves in response to
outputs from the PID controllers: the feed water flow, the coal feeder rate and the air flow.
(iii) Boiler Controller - this device allows to enter the configuration set-points for the system: the steam load and the coal
quality, which must be set up in advance by the operators.
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The Simulink model represents the control system as three PID controllers dealing with the feed water flow, the coal
feeder rate and the air flow. These three controllers output three eponymous variables: feed water flow (F_wf), coal feeder
rate (C_fr) and air flow (Air_f), respectively; these three variables, together with two configuration set-points (coal quality
and steam load) constitute the parameters which determine the behaviour of the boiler system. There are also several
internal variables generated by the smart sensors; some of these, together with the configuration set-points, provide the
inputs to the PID controllers, in particular: bus pressure set-point (P_ref), O2 set-point (O2_ref), drum level (D_l), steam
flow (S_f), steam pressure/drum (P_d), steam pressure/bus (P_b), O2 concentration at economizer (O2eco), CO
concentration at economizer  (Coeco), and NOx concentration at economizer (Noxeco).
Anderson et. al. [AF03] summarise the available information describing the correct COTS component behaviour to be
used in developing the protective wrappers. The following analysis helped the authors to formulate three types of
erroneous conditions that can be detected by the protective wrappers positioned between the COTS components and the
rest of the system: (i) Unavailability of inputs/outputs to/from the PID controllers; (ii) Violation of specifications of
monitored variables; and (iii) Oscillations in monitored variables.
This information served as a base for formulating a number of acceptable behaviour constraints that were used in defining
error detection features of the protectors. Depending on the severity of the errors and on the specific characteristics of the
system, two types of recovery are used in the case study: raising an alarm and safe stop.
4.2. Architectural Solution
In this section, we describe an architectural solution for the steam boiler system conforming to the C2 architectural style
and applying the idealised C2 COTS (iCOTS) previously described (section 3.2).
4.2.1. System Configuration
Figure 6 shows the proposed C2 architectural configuration which is organized in four layers: (i) the BoilerController
component; (ii) the WaterFlowController and CoalFeederController; (iii) the AirFlowController, which has as input
the CoalFeederRate from the CoalFeederController; and (iv) the sensors and actuators required by the system.
Table 1 specifies the operations provided by some key components that appear in Figure 6.
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Drum Level Steam Flow
Feed WaterFlow
Sensor Sensor
Actuator
Water Flow
Steam Pressure
Bus Sensor
Coal Feeder Rate
Actuator
Coal Feeder
Air Flow
Air Flow
Actuator
Boiler
O2 Concentration
Sensor
Controller
Controller
Controller
conn1
conn2
conn3
Layer 1
Layer 2
Layer 3
Layer 4
Controller
Figure 6. C2 Configuration for the Boiler System
Table 1. List of Operations
Operation Provider Component
readDrumLevel() : D_l Drum Level Sensor
readSteamFlow() : S_f Steam Flow Sensor
readBusPressure() : P_b Steam Pressure Bus Sensor
readO2Concentration() : O2eco O2 Concentration Sensor
setFeedWaterFlow(F_wf) Feed Water Flow Actuator
setCoalFeedRate(C_fr) Cool Feeder Rate Actuator
Air Flow Controller
setAirFlow(Air_f) Air Flow Actuator
setConfiguration(P_ref, O2_ref) Coal Feeder Controller
Air Flow Controller
4.2.2. The Idealised AirFlowController
We assume that the three controllers are implemented reusing a COTS PID controller.  In this section, we describe how
we can build an iCOTS AirFlowController encapsulating the COTS PID controller with protectors. This solution equally
applies to the other two controllers.
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Figure 7 shows the internal structure of the iCOTS for the AirFlowController, based on Figure 3. The COTS PID
controller is wrapped by a pair of error detectors (upper_detector and lower_detector) and inserted into an iC2C as its
NormalActivity component. Both detectors use OscillatorChecker, which is responsible for checking whether oscillating
variables revert to a stable state before a maximum number of oscillations. Table 2 specifies, for each detector, the
message types to be inspected, their corresponding assertions that guarantee the acceptable behaviour constraints (section
4.1) and the type of the exception notification that should be generated when a contraint is violated. Table 3 summarises
these exception types, grouped by their generalised types. Two of these exception types are interface exceptions that are
sent directly to the next lower level in the architectural configuration. The other exceptions types are internal exceptions,
to be handled by the AFCErrorHandler.
PID3 Controller
( COTS )
AFC Error Handler
upper_detector
lower_detector
afc_top
afc_internal
afc_bottom
Oscillator
Checker
Oscillator
Checker
(f/ C_fr)
(f/ Air_f)
afcld_bottom
afcld_top
afcud_bottom
afcud_top
Figure 7. Decomposition of the AirFlowController
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Table 2. Error Detection Specifications
Message Type Constraints to be checked Exceptional Notification
lower_detector
0 <= O2_ref <= 0.1 InvalidConfigurationSetpoint
Request setConfiguration(P_ref, O2_ref) the corresponding notification must be
received within a specified time
interval
PIDTimeout
0 <= C_fr <= 1 InvalidCoalFeederRate
Request setCoalFeeder(C_fr) check_oscillate(Air_f) CoalFeederRateOscillating
the corresponding notification must be
received within a specified time
interval
PIDTimeout
upper_detector
0 <= Air_f <= 0.1 InvalidAirFlowRate
Request setAirFlow(Air_f) check_oscillate(Air_f) AirFlowRateOscillating
the corresponding notification must be
received within a specified time
interval
AirFlowActuatorTimeout
Notification from readO2Concentration() 0 <= O2eco <=1 InvalidO2Concentration
Table 3. Summary of Exceptional Notifications
Exception Notification Generic Exception Type
PIDTimeout NoResponse
AirFlowActuatorTimeout (Unavailability of inputs/ outputs
to/from the PIDController)
InvalidConfigurationSetpoint*
InvalidCoalFeederRate* OutOfRange
InvalidO2Concentration (Violation of specifications of
monitored variables)
InvalidAirFlowRate
CoalFeederRateOscillating Oscillation
AirFlowRateOscillating (Oscillations in monitored variables )
* Interface exceptions.
In this example, the recovery actions are delegated to the BoilerController component, which may either sound an alarm
or shut down the system, depending on the exception type. Thus, internal exceptions are propagated by the
AFCErrorHandler as failure exceptions of the generic type of the corresponding internal exception, using the mapping
shown in Table 3. A PIDTimeout exception, for example, will generate a NoResponse failure exception.
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4.2.3. The BoilerController Component
This component is responsible for:
(i) configuring the boiler system, sending setConfiguration requests when appropriate;
(ii) handling interface exceptions of type InvalidConfigurationSetpoint, which may be raised in response of a
setConfiguration request;
(iii) handling failure exceptions of type NoResponse, OutOfRange or Oscillation, that may be raised by the three
controllers (WaterFlowController, CoalFeederController, AirFlowController).
We structured the BoilerController component as an iC2C, to cope with fault-tolerance responsabilities - itens (ii) and
(iii) above, apart from its main functional responsability - item (i), by two distinct internal components: the
AbnormalActivity and NormalActivity, respectively.
Table 4 specifies the actions to be taken by the AbnormalActivity component of the BoilerController, in response to each
exception type that it may receive.
Figure 8 shows the resulting fault-tolerant architecture for this system, which is derived from the overall architectural
configuration for the boiler system (Figure 6). Each of its three controllers is structured as idealised C2 COTS (iCOTS)
and the BoilerController as an idealised C2 component (iC2C). It is assumed that the sensors and actuators, as well as
the connectors, are reliable. Figure 9 illustrates the flow of messages between the various components involved when a
PIDTimeout exception occurs, after the BoilerController fails to configure the AirFlowController PIDController. When
the detector AirFlowController bottom connector (afcld_bottom) detects that the AirFlowController is not responding, it
raises an exception to AFCErrorHandler. As this AFCErrorHandler cannot cope with this exception type, it raises
another exception to the BCErrorHandler that shuts down the whole system.
Table 4. BoilerController Recovery Actions
Exception Type Recovery Action
InvalidConfigurationSetpoint
OutOfRange
Alarm and return to normal.
NoResponse
Oscillation
Shut down the system.
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Feed WaterFlow
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Actuator
Steam Pressure
Bus Sensor
Coal Feeder Rate
Actuator
Air Flow
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PID3 Controller
( COTS )
afc_top
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PID2 Controller
( COTS )
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cfr_internal
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C_fr Osc.
Checker
Error Handler
CFR
PID1 Controller
( COTS )
wfc_top
wfc_internal
wfc_bottom
F_wf Osc.
Checker
Error Handler
WFC
Boiler Controller
Normal Activity
bc_top
bc_internal
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Error Handler
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Air_f  Osc.
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Figure 8. Resulting Configuration for the Boiler System
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setConfiguration()
:PID3 Controller
( COTS )Error Handler
:AFC:Control Panel
Normal Activity Error Handler
:CP
:afcld_bottom
setConfiguration()
timeStep()
FailureException
("PIDTimeout")
FailureException
("NoResponse")
shutDown()
timeStep()
timeStep()
(stopped)
Figure 9. Sequence Diagram for a PIDTimeout Exception
4.2.4. Sample Implementation
Figures 10 and 11 shows a partial implementation of the protector for the AirFlowController. The listing in Figure 10
shows a class definition for its lower detector and how it intercepts a setConfiguration request and its corresponding
notification. When this request is intercepted the detector checks if it violates a contraint and may decide to: (i) forward
the request to the COTS PID Controller, if it does not violate any contraint; or (ii) send an interface exception notification
down to the component that originated this request. If the request is accepted, the lower detector waits for the
corresponding notification. If this notification is not received within an specified number of time steps it sends a
PIDTimeout failure exception notification, to be handled by the AirFlowController error handler. The listing in Figure 11
shows a class definition for this error handler, which sends a NoResponse failure exception when a PIDTimeout exception
is received.
5. Related Work
This section compares our approach with several relevant existing proposals. The main comparison criteria are the types
of the components (application-level or middleware/OS level), fault tolerance (error detection and recovery) provided,
type of the redundancy, the information used for developing error detection and recovery, phases of the life cycle (at
which they are applied).
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class AFC_LowerDetector extends ICOTSDetector {
private Request req;
private boolean waitingSetConfiguration=false;
private boolean waitingCycles;
public void handle(Request r) {
IC2CException exc=null;
if (r.type().equals("setConfiguration")) {
try {
float o2ref=((Float)r.getParameter("O2_ref")).floatValue();
if (o2ref < 0 || o2ref > 0.1)
exc=new IC2CInterfaceException("InvalidConfigurationSetpoint", r);
else {
waitingSetConfiguration==true;
waitingCycles==10;
req=r;
}
} catch (Exception e) {
exc=new IC2CInterfaceException("InvalidConfigurationSetpoint", r);
}
}
if (exc==null)
send (r);
else
send (exc);
}
public void handle(Notification n) {
if (n.type().equals("setConfiguration")) {
waitingSetConfiguration==false;
}
send(n);
}
public void timeStep() {
if (waitingSetConfiguration) {
if(--waitingCycles==0) {
send (new IC2CFailureException("PIDTimeout", req));
waitingSetConfiguration=false;
}
}
}
}
Figure 10. AFC Lower Detector Implementation.
class AFC_ErrorHandler extends IC2CErrorHandler {
public void handle(IC2CException e) {
if (e.type().equals("PIDTimeout")) {
send (new IC2CFailureException("NoResponse", e.request());
}
}
}
Figure 11. AFC Error Handler Implementation.
Ballista [KD99] works with POSIX systems coming from several providers. The approach works under a strong
assumption that the normal specification of the component is available, from which error detectors can be specified. In
addition to this, the results of fault injection are used for the specification of error detectors. A layer between the
applications and the operating system (OS), intercepting all OS calls as well as the outgoing results, implements this error
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detection. The recovery provided by this approach is very basic (blocking the erroneous calls) and is not application-
specific.
A very interesting approach to developing protective wrappers for a COTS microkernel is discussed in [SR99]. The idea
is to specify the correct behaviour of a microkernel and to make the protective wrapper check all functional calls (similar
to Ballista, this approach cannot be applied for application-level COTS components that lack a complete and correct
specification of the component’s behaviour). Reflective features are employed for accessing the internal state of the
microkernel to improve the error detection capability. In addition, the results of fault injection are used in the design of
wrappers for catching those calls that have been found to cause errors of the particular microkernel implementation. A
recent work [RF02] shows how recovery wrappers can be developed within this framework to allow for recovery after
transient hardware faults, which is mainly based on redoing the recent operation.
Unfortunately these two approaches focus only on the later phases of the system development, without offering any
assistance in developing fault tolerant system architectures. The Simplex framework (the best summary of this work
performed in mid 90’s can be found in [S01]) proposes an architectural solution to dealing with the faults of the
application-level COTS components. The idea is to employ two versions of the same component: one of them is the COTS
component itself and another one is a specially-developed unit implementing some basic functions. The second unit is
assumed to be bug free as it implements very simple algorithms. The authors call this analytical redundancy. The two
units together form a safety unit in which only externally observable events of the COTS component are dealt with. The
system architect is to implement a set of consistency constraints on the inputs to the COTS component and the outputs
from it, as well as on the states of the device under control. This approach is oriented towards developing fault tolerant
architectures of control systems. The disadvantage of this approach is that it is not recursive as it treats the whole control
software as one unit and provides fault tolerance at only this level.
Rakic et. al. [RM01] offers a software connector-based approach to increasing the dependability of systems with COTS
components. The idea is to employ the new and the (several if available) old versions to improve the overall system
dependability. The authors put forward the idea of using a specialised multi-version connector allowing a system's
architect to specify the component authority for different operations: a component designated as authoritative will be
considered nominally correct with respect to a given operation. The connector will propagate only the results from an
authoritative version to the rest of the system and at the same time, log the results of all the multi-versioned components'
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invocations and compares them to the results produced by the authoritative version. The solution is mainly suitable for
systems in which COTS components are to be upgraded (under the assumption that the interface of the old and new
components remain unchanged) so there are several versions of a component in place.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
When building reliable systems from existing components, guarantees cannot be given on the system behaviour, if no
guarantees are provided on the behaviour of its individual components. Since no such guarantees are provided for
individual COTS components, architectural means at the component level have to be devised for the provision of the
necessary guarantees at the system level.. The paper proposes an architectural solution to turning COTS components into
idealised fault-tolerant COTS components by adding protective wrappers to them. We demonstrate the feasibility of the
proposed approach using the steam boiler system case study, where its controllers are built reusing unreliable COTS
components. Although we recognize that the proposed approach can result in incorporating repetitive checks into the
integrated system, this is an unavoidable outcome considering the lack of guarantees provided by COTS components. For
example, it might be the case that a COTS component has internal assertions checking the validity of an input parameter
that is also checked by its protector, or other protectors in other COTS components. However, there are situations in
which the system integrator can take care of this by coordinating development of fault tolerance means associated with
individual components - we did not address this problem in our paper.
Although the case study has used a single architectural style, software components in the C2 architectural style can be
nevertheless integrated into configurations of other architectural styles using simple adapters. This allows the idealised
fault tolerant COTS (iCOTS) concept to be applied as a general solution in developing dependable systems from
unreliable COTS components. Our future work includes extending an existing C2 Java framework [UCI02] to aid in the
implementation of this new abstraction and its integration into C2 architectural configurations.
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